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Abstract 
 
In the early 1990s, large numbers of children in India remained out of school. International 
commitments to achieve education for all (EFA) globally meant that India was an important case 
for donors. India was pressed to accept aid for primary education, and agreed with some 
reluctance. Although subsequent donor involvement was substantial and influenced aspects of 
both policy implementation and management, it is shown that Indian education policy priorities 
remained self-determined.  The Government of India – though falling short of securing universal 
education for its children - succeeded in using external resources and expertise in ways which 
suited its own purposes, whilst minimising external impact on policy development. The politics 
and economics of this process are discussed.  
 
 
Introduction:  Education, Aid and Development – the shift to basics 
 
During the past three decades the importance attributed by governments and international 
agencies to investment in basic education has changed profoundly.  During the 1960s and 
1970s, primary education was given far less emphasis in national economic plans, and aid 
documents, than was accorded to the higher levels of education, which were judged to be 
the central means of producing the skilled ‘manpower’ needed to achieve rapid economic 
growth in the countries of the South.  During the 1980s, however, evidence that primary 
schooling provided an important means of reducing poverty began to emerge (Colclough 
1982; Behrman 1990).  This showed that primary schooling not only gave better access to 
formal sector employment for poor households, but that it provided skills which brought 
greater productivity in rural and informal work, and encouraged behavioural change 
(particularly in the areas of health, nutrition and fertility) which allowed a range of other 
                                                 
1 This project is part of the Research Consortium on Education Outcomes and Poverty (RECOUP), which is 
funded by DFID.  The views expressed here are those of the authors and cannot be attributed to DFID, or to 
any of RECOUP’s partner institutions.  A version of this paper which excludes the statistical appendix, is 
forthcoming in the International Journal of Educational Development.  
2 Centre for Education and International Development, University of Cambridge, UK.  
3 Collaborative Research and Dissemination (CORD), New Delhi, India.  
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development objectives to be achieved.  This evidence became increasingly influential in 
investment allocation, leading to significant changes in the practice of aid policy, and in 
the extent to which developing country governments gave renewed emphasis to primary 
education in their own plans and programmes.   
 
As a consequence of this changing balance of evidence, many aid agencies increased 
resources for primary schooling.  A watershed for such attitudes was the World 
Conference on Education for All, held at Jomtien, Thailand, in 1990, jointly convened by 
the World Bank, UNICEF, UNESCO and UNDP.  It proposed the attainment of universal 
primary education (UPE) by 2000, and five additional undertakings on other aspects of 
access to education and the quality of learning were affirmed (UNESCO 1990).  A 
UNICEF paper, presented at the conference, indicated that these bold targets were 
attainable provided that sufficient resources were made available by national 
governments, supplemented by significantly increased levels of international aid (see 
Colclough with Lewin 1993).  Arising from the conference both the World Bank and 
UNICEF announced ambitious increases in their intended support for primary schooling.  
DFID also signalled its intention to put increased emphasis on the primary sector, and on 
adult literacy and non-formal education (ODA 1994) – a trend that was to define its 
approach during the first decade of the new century (DFID 1999). A number of other 
donors (notably Netherlands, Canada, and Sweden) were to reveal similar intentions.   
The global commitments made by developing country governments at Jomtien to achieve 
the education for all (EFA) targets in their own countries suggested that there would be 
no shortage of willing recipients of this newly-pledged  aid support.   
 
India was to be prominent amongst such choices.  Of the global total of some 145 million 
children of primary-school age who were out of school in the late 1980s, some 60 per 
cent were resident in four countries - India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nigeria (Lockheed, 
Verspoor and Associates 1991: 28-9) - and up to half of them (some 30-40 million 
children) were estimated to be in India.  Because of the sheer size of the Indian 
population, and its rate of growth, the annual additions to the Indian primary-age cohort 
were larger than anywhere else.  Accordingly, with more than one million new places 
needed every year simply to avoid retrogression in the proportion of children enrolled, 
the task of achieving UPE in India was the most daunting facing any nation (Colclough 
with Lewin 1993: Table A1).  India’s experience would thus be a critical determinant of 
global progress. Reflecting this perception, over the years following the Jomtien 
conference, international aid to education in India increased to a level which, by the 
century’s end, was larger than for any other country.  Although it fell back subsequently, 
transfers remained substantial in comparative international terms (UNESCO 2008: 402).    
 
India’s experience is, therefore, important to examine, if we wish to learn about aid’s 
impact on education policy.  This paper investigates the objectives of the donor agencies 
providing aid to Indian education, and of the government in accepting it. An assessment 
of aid’s policy impact is undertaken, using both documentary sources and evidence from 
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interviews with members of the donor community, the central government and civil 
society. 4 
 
Total Aid flows to India – patterns and causes 
 
Because of the sheer size and relative poverty of much of its population, India has always 
stood out among other aid-recipient countries. Since the 1950s, the country has been a 
major recipient of foreign aid, accounting for between 5 and 7 percent of total official 
development assistance (ODA) during its first four decades of independence.  In absolute 
terms it was always amongst the top three recipients of net aid until the late 1980s 
(Lipton and Toye, 1991: 3).  This dominance has continued to the present day.  Aid to 
India still accounts for about 4 per cent of total aid disbursements, and India’s aid receipts 
of about $4 bn. in 2005 and 2006 were exceeded only by the large and exceptional levels 
of debt forgiveness accorded to Iraq and Nigeria in those years (OECD 2008).   
 
On other measures, however, India can be judged to be substantially under-aided.  For 
example, during the 1990s its aid receipts averaged only around $2 per person per year, 
compared with the middle-income country average of $9 (Degnbol-Martinussen,  
Engberg-Pedersen and Bille 2003), whilst in 2006, India’s average of $4 per capita 
compared with $12 for the average middle income country in that year (and with much 
higher values, of course, for many of the poorest countries) (OECD 2008).  From the 
mid-1950s until 1980, the real value of total aid remained roughly constant at around Rs. 
80 bns per year (in 1999 prices).5   However, over the following five years the real value 
of aid flows to India increased - roughly doubling by 1990 to around Rs. 150 -160 bns per 
year, since when they have again remained roughly constant.6  But the subsequent rapid 
growth of the Indian economy meant that the direct contribution of aid to India’s overall 
economic activity fell to little more than 0.1% of GDP by 2006 (OECD 2008). 
Accordingly, although aid initially made an important contribution to the government’s 
investment programme, over the past ten years this has become much less significant, and 
in GDP terms its quantum is now tiny.  
 
Its net value significance is further reduced by two other characteristics.  First, there has 
been a gap between the amount of aid which agencies have agreed to supply and the 
amounts which have actually been forthcoming (Figure 1). By the 7th plan period (1985-
90) aid receipts were running at only about half of the agreed levels and recovered only to 
about 80% of what had been agreed throughout the 9th and 10th plan periods.  Amongst 
several causes of this unsatisfactory performance was that, since the financing of 
education had become a responsibility shared between the central and state governments 
(see below), the Government of India (GOI), rather than the State ministries, was directly 
                                                 
4 Where interview material is referred to in the text it is indicated in the form: ‘Int.1’, ‘Int.2’, etc.  The past 
and present functional roles of interviewees are described in the Annex.  Their names and precise jobs are 
omitted, to preserve anonymity.   
5 This was equivalent to $1.86bn, at the 1999 exchange rate of $1=Rs.43.   Subsequently the rupee fell by 
up to 10% in dollar terms, but was at a value of around $1= Rs.46 in early 2010. 
6 See Appendix Table 6B, which shows aid receipts under each of the five year plans. 
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involved in aid negotiations.  This encouraged a gap between planning and 
implementation, and slowed the process of aid disbursement.  
Figure 1: Aid Flows in India in Constant Prices (1999=100)
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A second factor which has reduced the net value of aid is its more frequent provision in 
the form of concessional loans (90% of the total from the 1990s onwards) than grants: 
partly because of an increased proportion of aid coming from multilateral sources.7  
Accordingly, the grant element of aid is substantially less than the gross figures suggest 
and interest payments on past loans increased markedly after 1990.  Indeed, from 1997 
onwards, repayments of interest and principal by the Indian government actually began 
to exceed the value of new aid receipts (Figure 1).  Thus, net aid transfers to India have 
actually been negative over the past decade.     
 
The UK provided more than half of the value of all grants received by GOI during 2000 - 
2007.  A further 17 percent came from EEC, with 5 per cent each from Germany and the 
Netherlands. Japan has also been a major donor, mainly supporting infrastructure and 
environmental protection projects by means of a large loans programme. Over 20 per cent 
of the value of all loans received by GOI since the mid-1980s were from Japan, with a 
further 60 per cent coming from the World Bank and IDA.  In all, some 20 countries 
provided grants or loans over the period since the late 1980s.  Five multilateral 
institutions – ADB, IDA, IBRD, IFAD and OPEC - have also been important donors. 
 
Nevertheless, as the proportionate importance of aid to the Indian economy fell during 
the 1990s increased skepticism about the need for aid became evident in government 
circles.  This was fanned by the mid-decade suspension of aid by a number of donors 
                                                 
7 See Appendix Table 4A, 4B and 6B.   
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(including - inter alia - USA, Canada, France, the Netherlands, Italy and the 
Scandinavian countries) in response to India’s nuclear testing programme.  Equally, India 
had itself become a significant provider of aid (Saxena 2003), and its aspirations for UN 
Security Council membership seemed unlikely to be furthered by its continuing to be a 
major aid recipient. 
 
In 2003, a newly elected Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Government sharply changed the 
government's policy on aid.  Giving little notice of its intentions, it terminated agreements 
with all except six large bilateral donors (UK, Germany, Japan, USA, European Union 
and the Russian Federation).8  Interviews with GOI staff in Delhi indicated that this was 
partly in response to a number of technical factors: the many small donor agencies 
expected separate dealings with government; these costs were enhanced by aid 
requirements which reflected the planning cycles of the bilaterals rather than those of 
India. Quite separately, the GOI was more comfortable with receiving aid from 
multilateral agencies, on whose governing bodies they were represented, than from the 
bilaterals, whose agenda India could do little to control (de Groot et al 2008; Int. 7). 
Those agencies with smaller programmes were henceforth allowed to contribute to NGOs 
directly, provided that the recipient organizations had prior government permission to 
receive foreign currency for their work, or alternatively to route their finance through a 
multilateral agency.  All technical assistance programmes were also allowed. 
  
Nevertheless, it seems that the dominant motive of the new Government was political.  
The BJP administration was more conservative than its predecessors and suspicious of 
allowing foreign agencies freedom to support NGO and other initiatives in an 
uncontrolled way (Int. 14; Int. 11). They also intended “to signal a change in India’s 
status from 'aid-taker' to 'aid-giver'” (Saxena 2003).   Following the installation of a new 
Congress Party government in 2004, bilateral development cooperation was accepted 
again from all the G8 countries and those providing more than $25m. per year. 
Nevertheless, these modifications of the rules were not sufficient, nor timely enough, to 
change the exit decisions of some of the bilateral donors.9 Their numbers remained much 
reduced compared with the position pre-200310 and only three countries were re-included 
in the list of bilateral donors (France, Italy, Canada). 
 
Over the half century since aid to India began, not only have there been significant 
changes in the number of agencies and aid volumes, but there have also been major shifts 
in the composition of aid.  Initially the focus was on providing bilateral food aid, which 
accounted for about 9 per cent of aid receipts during 1966-74, mainly provided under US 
Public Law 480 (Lipton and Toye 1991: 50-1), and on supporting the foreign exchange 
                                                 
8 For these purposes the EU was treated as a ‘bilateral’ donor.  See Shiravkumar 2003.  
9 There is evidence, however, that at least two of the agencies had already decided, for separate reasons, to 
scale down their aid programmes sharply.  Thus the BJP ruling provided them with a convenient 
justification for their intended action (Int. 11).  
10 The bilateral aid programmes of Canada, Denmark, Italy, France, Norway, Netherlands and Sweden, 
were either not renewed or were reduced to insignificant proportions after 2003, as were grants from 
UNICEF, IFAD and Ford.  In the case of the latter group there was a shift from providing grant finance to 
GOI for specific development purposes towards directly funding Indian NGOs, as encouraged by the 
government from 2004.   
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requirements and investment expenditures of India’s successive Plans.   During the 
1990s, however, significant proportions of aid were allocated, for the first time, to the  
 
 
Figure 2: Proportion of Aid Receipts Allocated to Social 
Sectors
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social sectors.11  Such allocations rose rapidly from less than 5 per cent in 1990 to more 
than one-quarter of total aid by the turn of the century, since when they fell back 
somewhat (Figure 2). These trends were led by education, altering the overall profile of 
aid to India, and changing its relationship with some of its key donor partners.   
 
Aid to Education in India – Shifting Priorities and their causes 
 
Before 1990, aid to Indian education had been small.  The school system had been 
mainly domestically financed, and aid was focused on post-secondary, technical and 
vocational education.  GOI judged it neither necessary nor desirable to involve outsiders 
in plans for the primary/elementary school systems.12  However, during the late 1980s, a 
number of strategic developments in both education and the economy presaged a change.  
For reasons discussed later, aid to education increased sharply and was, almost 
exclusively, directed towards elementary education.  
 
The resulting picture of aid to elementary education from the 7th to the 10th Plan-periods 
is summarized in Table 1.13  It should be noted that estimates of aid flows vary, 
depending upon at what point in the transfer process they are measured. Pledges made by 
                                                 
11 Social sector expenditures include those on education, health, livelihoods, water and sanitation, 
government and civil society, and other social infrastructure projects. 
12 Primary education in India is years 1-5, and upper primary is years 6-8.  Elementary education refers to 
both of these cycles together. 
13 Most aid is allocated to Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS).  Resources go, via the  Department of 
Education, to state budgets or directly to District Rural Development Agencies (DRDAs) or to State 
Implementation Societies (SIS). However, estimates from different sources are not always consistent. 
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donors (column 2) are often reduced when the monies are allocated for agreed purposes 
(Column 3), but only when they are utilized for the payment of project or programme 
costs does the transfer take effect (Column 4).  It is this final step which provides the 
closest measure of aid receipts.  
 
Table 1 
Expenditure allocations for Elementary Education during different Plans 
(Rs. millions) 
Five Year Plan Total Approved External aid allocated External Aid utilized 
7th Plan 
1987-1992 
6580 n.a. 81 
8th Plan 
1992-1997 
40060 6320 6130  
9th Plan  
1997-2002 
147540 87240 40930  
10th Plan 
2002-2007 
287500 49040 38270 
 
Source: Annual Financial Statistics, GOI, relevant years 
http://education.nic.in/planbudget/planexpen.pdf (p12) for tenth plan  
Note: Utilization data for 2006-7 are not available.  Data on allocation have been used for that year.  
 
The table shows the rapid increase in levels of aid to elementary education (both 
approved and allocated) from the Seventh to the Tenth Plans.  In current prices there was 
more than a 40-fold increase in aid approved for those purposes over the two decades.  
Nevertheless, just as for total aid, the resources actually received were much less. Only 
about 20 per cent of the resources approved were allocated during the 10th plan period, 
and levels of utilization were lower still, particular during the 9th plan.   
 
Table 2 confirms the rapidly rising trend of real aid receipts for education throughout the 
1990s. Although in 2002-3 when external aid was towards its peak, aid accounted for 
only 1.5% of total education expenditure and 3% of expenditure on elementary 
education, as a proportion of development expenditure its role was much more 
substantial.  It increased from 5 per cent of central government plan14 expenditure on 
education in 1993-94 to 20% in 2000-01 (Tilak 2008). The proportion was even higher 
for elementary education, rising from 10% to 35% over those years. Thus, aid donors 
financed a significant part of the development costs of elementary education 
expenditures in India over several years.  In principle, therefore, their influence over 
some aspects of the programme may have been substantial.  Whether, and in what ways, 
this is so are explored in what follows.    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Plan expenditure includes both the recurrent and development expenditures required to finance additional 
programmes specified under each five-year plan.  At the end of the plan period, the recurrent parts of plan 
expenditure remain as an ongoing commitment, and become part of non-plan expenditure. 
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Table 2: Estimates of Foreign Aid to Elementary Education in India  
 (Rs. millions) 
Year  External aid to elementary education 
(current prices) 
External aid to elementary education 
(constant prices: 1999=100) 
(1) (2) (3) 
1992-3 40.0 69.0 
1993-4 97.6 153.6 
1994-5 1033.3 1478.4 
1995-6 2159.4 2826.8 
1996-7 2016.2 2520.8 
1997-8 5618.9 6408.1 
1998-9 5853.0 6176.5 
1999-2000 7290.0 7373.2 
2000-1 9480.0 9246.9 
2001-2 12123.4 11424.9 
2002-3 13830.9 12641.9 
2003-4 9395.9 8271.8 
2004-5 6834.5 5714.8 
2005-6 19965.0 15985.9 
2006-7 16470.0 12628.2 
2007-8 16776.0 12253.3 
2008-9 15840.0 10767.5 
Sources: Bashir (2000) up to 1998-9; Tilak (2008) for years 1999 to 2001; expenditure budgets of GOI 
from 2001-2 
GDP deflator: source: http://www.economywatch.com/economic-statistics/India/GDP_Deflator/  
 
 
First Phase (to 1990): The beginnings of aid to elementary education - many projects, 
several donors.  
 
India’s Planning Commission adopted a sectoral approach towards education from its 
initial years of planning.15 Reflecting the constitution’s commitment, in 1950, that the 
state would endeavour to provide, within ten years, free and compulsory education to all 
children up to the age of fourteen years, Indian plans had from the beginning given 
priority to primary/elementary education. The first five year plan (1951-56) aimed to 
achieve 60% enrolment of those aged up to 11 years - up from 40% in 1950.16  Secondary 
schooling would need to grow in step with primary from around 10% to 15% of the age 
group. No quantitative targets were set for tertiary enrolments, where the emphasis was 
placed upon consolidation rather than expansion.  So although universal elementary 
education (UEE) was a declared target, a balanced development of the sector as a whole 
was advocated. 
 
                                                 
15 See, for example, Chapter 33,  ‘Education’, in Government of India (1951-56),  
16 One contemporary observer commented that ‘India’s economy will not permit achievement of anything 
like the constitutional goal; indeed it will be strained to meet the modest goals of the Planning 
Commission’ (Wood 1955: 523).  This observation remained apposite over the following half century. 
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In this and subsequent plans, the government provided development finance to the States 
through the Planning Commission, to help meet the capital needs of their education 
systems.  However, by the mid 1970s, the education sector had expanded considerably 
and the states found it increasingly difficult to meet even the recurrent expenditures of the 
sector. During the fifth plan (1974-78), whilst elementary education remained prioritised, 
the annual financial allocations had to be reduced from the levels originally planned 
owing to state-level resource constraints. It was clear that further support from central 
government would be required.  
 
The Constitutional Amendment of 1976, moved education from the State list to the 
Concurrent List,17 thereby enabling the central government to contribute more to state-
level education finance and to be involved in education planning. However, the sixth plan 
document observed that the problems in elementary education went beyond a lack of 
finance and it was necessary to bring about “changes and improvements in the system 
through increased attention to non-monetary inputs” (GOI 1980-85:Section 21.47). 
Growing concern about this need for reform led, during the seventh plan period (1985-
90), to a number of strategic developments in education and its governance and, for the 
first time, to an inflow of foreign aid to support elementary education.  
 
In 1986, early in the Seventh Plan period, the National Policy on Education (NPE) was 
formulated. This brought a new emphasis on elementary education, stressing the needs 
for universal enrolment, and substantial improvements in the quality of education. As 
part of the implementation of NPE a new Centrally Sponsored Scheme (CSS) - 
`Operation Blackboard' (OB) - was launched, that for Non-Formal Education was revised 
and new schemes for teacher education were also begun.  These developments formally 
signalled a change in the role of GOI in school education, taking “a larger responsibility 
to reinforce the national and integrative character of education, to maintain quality and 
standards …. and to study and monitor the educational requirements of the country” 
(GOI 1985-90: Vol. II, chapter 10). 
For the first time foreign assistance was accepted for several projects in primary 
education which aimed at extending its coverage and quality in innovative ways.  The 
motivation here was not so much to secure financial support, as to profit from innovative 
experience elsewhere.  There were few commonalities among them and the national 
government had to negotiate with each donor separately (Ayyar, 2007). They were, by 
nature, pilot projects, usually involving modest amounts of resources. Initially, they were 
included in state plans, but later projects were financed by transfers from GOI as part of 
the centrally sponsored schemes.  
The first group included the Andhra Pradesh Primary Education Project (APPEP), funded 
in 1986 by British Overseas Development assistance, and some non-formal education 
                                                 
17 The legislative powers of the central and the state governments are demarcated by the union, state and 
concurrent lists given in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. They regulate the spheres of 
influence of the Centre, the states, and the centre and the states combined, respectively. 
 10
projects funded by UNICEF. The objective of APPEP18 was to improve the quality of 
primary education in the project area by (a) providing school buildings and class-rooms 
of improved quality; and (b) enhancing the professional competence of teachers and 
supervisors of primary schools through training programmes. Then followed the Shiksha 
Karmi Project (1987), funded by the Swedish International Development Agency 
(SIDA), which sought - through better selection of local teachers by communities and 
provision of intensive pre- and in-service training - to address the problems of teacher 
absenteeism in difficult-to-access areas in Rajasthan. A third important initiative at this 
time was the Mahila Samakhya Project in Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat and Karnataka (1988-
90) funded by Dutch aid. This focused on empowering women from disadvantaged 
backgrounds, to enable them to take decisions about their own lives and environments 
and to create an educational opportunity which could help their – and their families’ - 
further development.19           
These projects focused on provision within specific districts or blocks within districts, 
rather than across entire states. They were different from other CSS in that they were 
managed by autonomous ‘state implementation societies’ – although the state’s 
education secretary was their formal head. These societies, derived from experience with 
the Rajasthan Shiksha Karmi Board, were supervised by government bureaucrats, and 
were subject to tight financial control, but were not bound by rigid government norms in 
their day-to-day functioning. They were believed to be flexible and effective, and were to 
become the usual implementation mechanism both for all aided projects and for other 
CSS in education.  
 
Second Phase (1990 - 2002): More donors, shifting from small projects to large scale 
programme support.  
 
During the early 1990s important changes in the macro environment occurred. Firstly, by 
1990/91, India had developed an unsustainable gap between public expenditures and 
revenues, which required urgent attention.  The attempt to stabilize the situation led to 
sharp reductions in public expenditures over the following two years, with consequent 
expenditure reductions in the social sector.20 Secondly, in 1992, constitutional 
amendments were adopted which allowed for decentralization of governance. For 
education this meant a transfer of school management responsibilities to local bodies at 
district, village and block levels.  The eighth plan document (1992-97) shifted the 
development focus down from educationally backward states to educationally backward 
districts. It also specified conditions for the acceptability of international aid: henceforth, 
aid resources had both to provide additional capacity beyond what was already being 
                                                 
18 Although the expenditures on APPEP were small for India, they were substantial for a donor agency.  
The British Overseas Development Administration commented that APPEP was ‘one of the most ambitious 
education projects ever supported by the ODA’  (ODA 1990:10).  Most expenditures, however, occurred on 
an expanded second phase of the project, after 1990 (Al Samarrai, Bennell, Colclough, 2002:24). 
19 See MHRD website: http://www.education.nic.in/cd50years/g/U/9F/0U9F0701.htm.  Other, smaller 
initiatives at this time included a Non-formal Education Project funded by NORAD. 
20 The fiscal deficit was reduced from 8.3% to 5.7% of GDP between 1990/1 and 1992/3, largely because 
of expenditure restraint, particularly within state-owned enterprises. (Toye 1999:18-19)   
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funded, and (reflecting earlier project experience) support innovative projects 
emphasising community participation, widening access and improving quality (GOI 
1992-97: vol 2, section 11.5.30). The changing role of aid in elementary education can be 
explained in the context of these conditions. 
Over the following decade, the volume of aid to education in India increased 
substantially. More donors – including some with very limited resources - were keen to 
support elementary education projects, particularly in backward states and districts. These 
included the Bihar Education Project (1990) supported by UNICEF, the Lok Jumbish 
project (1992) in Rajasthan supported by SIDA and the Uttar Pradesh-based education 
project (1991) supported by the World Bank. In addition, small amounts of foreign 
assistance from UNFPA and UNICEF were made available for specific project 
components of different institutions (Ramchandran, 1999).  
The new set of aided projects was based upon a more comprehensive strategy than the 
earlier generation. For example, the Bihar Education Project (BEP) covered all 
components of basic education and, reflecting the new aid conditions, it incorporated a 
simultaneous process of people-mobilization and micro-planning at district levels. Lok 
Jumbish also relied heavily on mobilisation and sought to bring about as much 
decentralisation of management, accountability and relevance to the educational system 
as possible. In both cases, project management was vested in state implementation 
societies. 
 
However, the process by which GOI accepted the World Bank as a major donor for 
elementary education took some considerable time. Although the Bank had been keen to 
give assistance to primary education since 1987, there was deep seated resistance towards 
it in India, particularly so amongst senior Ministry officials. The popular perception was 
that the Bank was a “domineering” partner which adopted a “hands-on management style 
in project design and management”, having “the propensity to offer universal 
prescriptions, to ignore country experience, to induct expatriate consultants regardless of 
need, and to insist on setting up the recipient country parallel project structures” (Ayyar 
2007). This was thought to be inimical to building up capabilities within the Indian 
system. In their dialogue with the Indian government the World Bank argued that they 
considered ownership and capacity-building essential for project sustainability (Int 16).  
But these arguments proved unconvincing to GOI. 
 
During the 1990 Jomtien conference, the World Bank placed further strong pressure upon 
the GOI to accept aid for education. GOI were invited to set their own terms - a reflection 
of the importance placed by the Bank upon its securing an Indian basic education 
programme.21  The 1986 education policy had set India’s agenda by giving absolute 
priority to elementary education; so policy differences were not at issue, but in early 
1990, India did not feel constrained financially, and nothing was agreed. Shortly 
afterwards, however, when India’s foreign exchange crisis appeared, broader external 
                                                 
21 Further testimony to the Bank’s persistence is indicated by its being the topic for a discussion between 
the World Bank President, Barber Conable and the GOI Minister of Education, during the Conference.  The 
matter was judged too significant to be settled by negotiations at the official level.  (Int 16)  
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support was required.  In response to a GOI request, the World Bank indicated that IDA 
support would be forthcoming, but only if aid for primary education were accepted. In the 
new circumstances the Ministry of Finance pressed the Ministry of Human Resource 
Development to accept the Bank’s condition and, in 1991, an IDA loan to support basic 
education was agreed for 5 districts in Uttar Pradesh. However it took almost two years 
for the Bank, the GOI and the Government of UP to agree on the project design.  
 
Prior to 1992, some states had been identified as educationally backward and had for that 
reason received central assistance under CSS.  But examination of district-level data 
showed that the inter-district variations were more significant than the inter-state 
variations. Moreover, it became apparent that states were too large and varied to serve as 
homogeneous units for educational planning purposes, and there was no guarantee that 
funds allocated to backward states would be spent on the backward districts within them. 
The putative success of the Total Literacy Campaign (TLC), which had used districts as 
its unit for planning, added weight to this view.  
 
Accordingly, in the eighth plan document, districts were divided into four categories, 
each with different plan strategies.  However, domestic funding was scarce, given the 
onset of economic crisis, and few district projects were at that time funded by aid.  This 
was recognized by the World Bank which offered a Social Safety Net Adjustment (SSN) 
Credit to support the district-based programme. Being well aware of India’s reservations 
about accepting aid for education, the Bank was very open to conditions being set by 
GOI.22  The European Community (EC) had also shown interest in funding projects in 
primary education since 1991, and the following year offered programme assistance to 
complement the forthcoming SSN credit. This enabled the Indian government to launch 
the District Primary Education Programme (DPEP) in 1993/4, the first education project 
funded from multiple sources to be developed indigenously. The central and state 
governments were expected to finance DPEP projects in the ratio 85:15, with aid from 
the World Bank, EU, DFID, UNICEF and the Netherlands supporting the GOI 
contribution.  
 
The resulting programme, which aimed to provide at least four or five years of good 
quality education to 6-14 year-olds,23 initially covered 42 districts across 7 states (three 
each from Kerala and Tamil Nadu, four each from Assam, Haryana and Karnataka, five 
from Maharashtra and 19 from Madhya Pradesh).  These districts were chosen according 
to two criteria – those where female literacy rates were below national average, and 
where TLC campaigns had been successfully implemented. In 1997, under a second 
phase of the programme, coverage expanded, albeit with variations in quality, from 42 to 
117 districts and, by 2000, some 219 districts in 15 states were included in the 
programme (World Bank 2007).  
 
                                                 
22 One condition was that the Bank should have at most two education staff-members in the Indian office 
(Int.16 ). 
23  The length of the primary cycle had developed differently across the country, and DPEP respected the 
existing practice of States.  
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The project design built upon national experience in elementary education, in TLCs, and 
in implementation of the earlier aided projects. In line with the directions of the eighth 
plan, DPEP became the first externally aided project with requirements for ‘additionality’ 
being imposed: participating states were required to maintain expenditures on elementary 
education at least at 1991/2 real values, in order to be eligible for foreign funds 
(Varghese 1994). This condition aimed to ensure that aid would not substitute for state 
budgetary allocations (as had happened during the initial years of APPEP). The 
programme was implemented through the state implementation societies, and other 
characteristics of the earlier, more flexible, project management models were also 
adopted. The focus was on community mobilization and participation, textbook creation, 
professional development of teachers, improved classroom practices, early childhood 
education and reform in educational management and planning, in line with the new plan 
guidelines.  An additional major difference from earlier schemes was that the targets 
were specified in terms of outcomes rather than inputs. In encouraging non-formal 
education and non-traditional teaching methods, DPEP brought contrasts with the state 
system which were not always popular.  
 
As will now be clear, education projects in this period (both DPEP and the other smaller 
aided projects) were implemented in many districts by state implementation societies, 
whereas elsewhere the system remained the responsibility of the state education 
department. There were thus major inter-district variations in school management and 
planning. DPEP districts were often seen to have more favoured status, including in 
levels of remuneration, which led to resentments building up amongst workers elsewhere.  
 
From the donors’ point of view the DPEP programme took on the properties of sectoral 
support, whilst remaining in project mode.  During its final phase, it covered some 219 of 
575 Indian districts.24  There had been no prior structure for grant support of this kind, 
and the modality, as it evolved, acquired many of the essentials of later Sector Wide 
Approaches (SWAPs).  Joint Review Missions (JRMs), for example, were used 
biennially for monitoring purposes from 1993/4.  Albeit somewhat unwieldy, with 30-40 
agencies represented, they became models for future sector support. Whilst states were 
the ultimate recipients, the aid dialogue was always with the GOI. The triggers for 
additional funding being released by donors were the successful attainment of 
programme and expenditure targets. Otherwise, there were no official conditionalities (Int 
7).  
 
As mentioned, in 1998, following India’s nuclear tests, several donors decided to 
withdraw from India. In the education sector, SIDA was the most important to leave, 
since it had been supporting two leading programmes – Shiksha Kami and Lok Jumbish 
(see below) - in Rajasthan. Those projects faced a temporary crisis, and alternative 
financing arrangements had to be made. This incident underlined, for many Indians, the 
intrinsic risks associated with having strong dependence upon external funding, and 
heightened unease about aid in senior government circles. 
 
                                                 
24 Somewhat surprisingly, notwithstanding this substantial size, at least one major donor continued to view 
DPEP as a pilot programme throughout the whole period (Int. 7). 
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Third phase (from 2002): Stronger harmonization, fewer agencies.  
 
The regular evaluations of projects part-funded by aid, and particularly the experience of 
DPEP’s JRMs, provided many lessons. These informed the design of the GOI’s new 
national elementary education programme, Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA), launched by 
GOI in 2001/2, which retained most of the DPEP goals.  Coverage, however, was 
extended to all districts  and it aimed to universalize not only primary (classes 1-5), but 
also elementary education (classes 1-8). Whereas the basic DPEP unit for planning was 
the district, in SSA it shifted down to the level of the habitation.  Thus, notions of 
decentralized planning and implementation were central to its design. The national SSA 
programme was intended to absorb all existing schemes in elementary education, 
including not only DPEP but also other externally-aided programmes.25 Its financing, 
however, was not to prove straightforward.  
 
It will be recalled that aid as a share of total education expenditure peaked in 2001-2 and 
subsequently decreased – partly a consequence of the changes to Indian policy in 2003 
which reduced the number of agencies, but also reflecting a major change in the nature of 
interactions between donors and the Indian government.   
 
Many of those bilaterals which, from 2003, were excluded on account of the size of their 
overall aid programme to India, could hardly be judged small in terms of their aid 
contribution to education. The Netherlands, for example, put close to Rs 3bn. annually 
into programmes for women’s education and empowerment (Mahila Samakhya), for 
social science research, and for local governance reforms in Kerala. Similarly, the 
Scandinavians had noteworthy collaboration in the areas of fishery and social forestry 
and, in education, in Lok Jumbish and Shiksha Karmi. The aggregate annual support 
from all the agencies which were excluded under the new provisions amounted to some 
5% of total aid to India (Sethi, 2003). 
 
Although these donor agencies were given the opportunity to fund NGOs directly, 
subject to their meeting new clearance conditions, its immediate impact was to reduce the 
number of donors to Indian elementary education.  After 2003, only the World Bank, 
DFID and the European Commission remained (with the other bilaterals phasing out 
their support of elementary education). Given the Indian government’s traditional 
reluctance to let donor countries influence its policies, together with increased efforts by 
donors to use programme-based approaches, and to work more consistently within 
recipient’s own planning frameworks,26 the donors accepted the new conditions set out 
by the government.  
 
Although GOI launched SSA without any financing from bilateral partners, insufficient 
resources were mobilised from internal budgetary sources and, in 2004 it requested the 
                                                 
25 Note, however, that DPEP continued in 22 districts until early 2007 and in 8 districts of Orissa until mid 
2008. 
26 This acceptance of the need to secure greater donor harmonization and country ownership was later 
formalised in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness  (OECD-DAC 2005) 
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World Bank (IDA), DFID and EC for assistance. By consequence, from a total projected 
cost of $3.5 bn. the donors jointly committed to providing around $1.046 bn. during the 
Tenth Plan – i.e. around 30% of the total. The World Bank was the major partner – 
providing a loan of nearly half the agreed amount (48%) while DFID (33%) and EC 
(19%) provided grants to cover the remainder. The Centre passed on aid resources to the 
states as a grant, irrespective of the form in which the aid was received.   
 
GOI took responsibility for funding 45% ($1.58 bn.) and the states 25% ($875 m.) of the 
programme development and recurrent costs over the Tenth Plan period. Also in 2004, an 
annual education cess of 2% was added as a supplement to all existing taxes, to be used 
by GOI solely and exclusively for elementary education.  
 
The twin national sources of finance proved to be very fruitful for SSA. The funds from 
the education cess allowed the GOI to provide much higher allocations than anticipated, 
and the States mainly matched these allocations. However, the contributions from the 
donors were predetermined.  Accordingly, whilst expenditure on SSA between 2003/4 
and 2006/7, at US$ 7.8 bn., was more than double the projected outlay of $3.5 bn. 
(Ayyar 2008), the contributions from donors, being fixed in monetary terms, amounted to 
only 13.6 percent of this expenditure, rather than the planned 30 percent, and this credit 
had been fully disbursed 15 months before the due date. 
 
A second phase of support for SSA was agreed in 2007 between GOI and its three main 
development partners. The framework for cooperation between them remained 
essentially the same. Total external aid was expected to contribute around $1 bn. of the 
planned project cost of $10.7 bn.  The World Bank, DFID and EC agreed to provide 
60%, 30% and 10% of the external resources, respectively, with the remaining project 
costs being met by the states and GOI in a 40:60 ratio (World Bank 2008).  
 
Changing role of the Donors 
 
The developments described above led to significant changes in donors’ roles in Indian 
education, which became mainly focussed upon financing elementary education through 
the SSA programme. At the outset of SSA in 2001/2, the GOI had initially invited only 
the European Commission to provide support, thereby excluding the other main partners 
in DPEP funding – the World Bank and DFID – a reflection of the Government’s 
intention to reduce the number of donor agencies.  However, following careful lobbying, 
all the partners were invited to join the funding effort for SSA in 2002 (Int.4).  
 
SSA rapidly became an exemplar of effective donor harmonization.  GOI documentation 
presented at international fora (GOI 2006) stated that donor-GOI cooperation on SSA 
provided an  “excellent example of harmonization at programme level”.  Although it was 
presumably in GOI interests to claim that things were working well, such praise would 
have been unlikely had they not.  The particular strengths of this donor-GOI collaboration 
were said to be the following:  
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• SSA was the first Sector Wide Approach (SWAP) in the country27;  
• external funds and GOI resources were pooled, with no parallel financing 
structures;  
• procedures were harmonised through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
with common formats for all partners; Joint Review Missions minimized the 
transaction costs of dealing with different agencies;  
• the SWAP approach was agreed on the basis of the existing SSA Framework and 
the GOI’s 10th 
 
Five-Year Plan, which was accepted in lieu of a Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP); and  
• the arrangements for SSA were judged to be soundly built on the decade-long 
DPEP experience of partnership for basic education in India.  
 
The donors made four-year commitments. Disbursements occurred not as advances but as 
reimbursement of expenditures by GOI on SSA.  GoI introduced their own strategies to 
ensure that aid resources remained additional to domestic funds. The aid conditions 
required GOI to maintain their real education spending at the levels achieved in 2002/03 
and the states were to maintain their non-SSA elementary education expenditures at those 
of 1999/2000 levels, in addition to financing their 25% share of SSA expenditures. 
 
Harmonization was facilitated by all partners using the same monitoring and reporting 
procedures, based on those already in place for Centrally Sponsored Schemes. These 
included bi-annual JRMs, the existing GOI procedures for Public Financial Management 
(PFM), auditing and reporting and a shared approach to managing fiduciary risk. 
 
Interviewees from the three development partner agencies valued having a diversity of 
views with transaction costs minimised, each playing to their respective priorities and 
strengths. The World Bank has led on financial management, and has also supported 
environmental safeguards, indigenous populations and education statistics (Int. 3). DFID 
has focussed upon access and equity issues whilst the EC has provided support 
particularly to quality and public-private partnerships (Ints. 1, 5, 7; GOI 2006). 
 
The roles of donors with smaller programmes changed sharply after the BJP 
Government’s suspension of agreements in 2003, being required henceforth to channel 
aid directly to NGOs in pursuit of enhanced aid-effectiveness and reductions in GOI – 
agency interaction.  Using a project mode little changed from earlier years, those 
remaining found it advantageous to be able to talk directly with state governments 
regarding the implementation of projects they supported (Int.5). However, Netherlands, 
Denmark, Australia and Sweden decided not to reinstate their assistance, and some, 
including the Swedes, opted for an accelerated exit, with GOI paying back outstanding 
loans in advance of their due dates. Some were still in the process of revising their 
intervention strategy during 2008/9 (Int.11). 
 
                                                 
27 Strictly, however, SSA is a sub-sectoral programme limited to elementary schooling 
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International versus National Priorities 
 
Historically, India’s national development priorities in education have matched those 
held by the international community quite closely.  The international shift in policy 
emphasis towards a focus on primary education in fact lagged behind that of India.  
Neither was directly influenced by the other, and all interviewees agreed that GOI policy 
priorities were self-determined. The decision to universalise elementary education had 
been independently taken by the Indian planners and was already part of national policy 
by the late 1980s (Int.9; GOI 1986). The international agenda following from the 1990 
Jomtien conference added to, rather than established, its focus at that time. Ten years 
later, when the MDGs were endorsed, DPEP had already laid the foundation for scaling 
up elementary education in India and the SSA programme had been planned in outline by 
the government.  Thus the priorities of GOI already matched those of the MDGs, 
although India’s focus was to universalise eight years of education rather than the five or 
six years often implied by UPE (depending upon national practice).  The Dakar meeting 
did not, therefore, have a strong impact on Indian policy-makers (Int.4; Int.9), possibly 
because it retained a focus on universalising primary education, which had been an earlier 
target (albeit not yet achieved) in the Indian case.  
 
The emphasis on primary and, later, on elementary education nevertheless remained a 
more partial strategy than had characterised (in planning terms, if not in implementation) 
India’s earlier whole-sector approach.  Adult literacy and vocational education 
programmes remained on the sidelines, even though many school dropouts were 
languishing without jobs or skill-training. Moreover the pressure on secondary education, 
as a result of the accelerated shift towards EFA, built up strongly, but was neither 
anticipated nor planned.  Accordingly, to the extent that the international community 
added weight to GOI’s policy priorities, it could be argued that the Jomtien conference, 
and that in Dakar ten years later, brought some minor negative influences on the 
development of India’s education strategy.  
 
Although Indian policy may have been only marginally affected, donor agency decisions, 
on the other hand, were strongly influenced by these international conferences. For 
example, Jomtien’s refocusing towards primary education was highly influential in 
determining the EC’s new aid approach in education, and its support to DPEP was an 
early product of this policy (Ints. 4,7). The World Bank, having previously concentrated 
upon technical and higher education, switched to emphasizing primary education after the 
Jomtien conference28. A significant change in emphasis towards basic education in 
DFID’s aid policy also occurred (ODA 1994), and its status and importance for the 
agency were later reaffirmed by the adoption of the MDGs as central objectives for 
DFID’s aid programme (Int. 1).  
 
This does not mean that all aid to education in India shifted to the elementary sector. 
Several of the bilateral agencies with smaller programmes, including Japan, Australia and 
                                                 
28 The Bank had commissioned a major internal study on improving primary education in developing 
countries (Lockheed, Vespoor et.al. 1991), and was ready to issue a new primary education policy paper 
(World Bank 1990), both of which were available in draft form at the WCEFA. 
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France, pursued policies which were not demonstrably influenced by these new priorities, 
continuing to fund technical and higher education, particularly in the form of scholarships 
or technical collaboration. The World Bank, also, supported technical education projects 
from the mid 1980s Subsequently, polytechnics, Industrial Training Institutes, 
government engineering colleges, National Institutes of Technology and some private 
institutions were funded by the Bank (Int. 14).  
 
 
Impact of donors on education policy 
 
Without exception, interviewees from the major donors believed that education policy in 
India has been formulated by the Indian government. There is full policy ownership, with 
strong leadership being provided by GOI. Policy continuity has been strong, as witnessed 
by SSA surviving the change of government in 2004. In these circumstances, prospective 
donors needed to compare their own mandate with what the government was offering. 
Once decided, there was little further scope for discussion of policy parameters. There 
has, however, been serious dialogue with government on matters of process and practice 
and, in the case of financial management, adopted procedures have been mainly 
externally determined.     
 
The GOI’s initial reluctance to negotiate with the World Bank stemmed from its concern 
to maintain its autonomy over policy decisions.  In that regard, the mode of collaboration 
with the Bank was judged to be of great importance. Accordingly, the GOI rejected the 
Bank’s offer of a sector investment credit, which would have allowed greater flexibility 
in implementing a project like DPEP, in favour of a more traditional project credit. The 
advantage for GOI was that the financing negotiations could thereby be confined to 
matters of project detail, rather than risking a more extensive policy dialogue. A credit 
from the EC was accepted more easily because it was a fast disbursal grant, requiring as a 
condition only that a specified number of district plans would be prepared. 
Notwithstanding the strong GOI stance, donors sometimes attempted, usually 
unsuccessfully, to renegotiate policy details even after the DPEP project design had been 
agreed. For example, the World Bank initially resisted implementation being undertaken 
by state registered societies rather than state governments (Ayyar 2003), and was 
unhappy about the criteria for choice of districts for DPEP support (those having had 
successful TLC campaigns).  However, the government refused to compromise.  Equally, 
GOI refused to allow the Bank to negotiate directly with state governments, on the 
grounds that the latter did not have the power to implement the agreed conditionalities 
(Int.10). This resilience in negotiations led to post-1994 dialogue with GOI being 
focussed upon implementation rather than policy. 
  
Since the mid-1990s, then, the DPEP/SSA aid dialogue was conducted between donor 
agencies and the central government. The 24-member JRM team– half being nominated 
by the government (bureaucrats, academicians and non-government stake-holders) and 
half by the donor agencies - met every six months, publishing an agreed aide-memoire 
with conclusions binding on the government. The GOI’s ownership of its content has 
been high and its proposals for change (usually concerning matters of practice) have been 
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implemented.  Even the annual JRM visit to review progress in a sample of States has 
provided little opportunity for dialogue between development partners and state 
governments.  Thus, many policy matters requiring action by the States have not been 
discussed, and the influence of donors on policy has been both limited and confined to 
the centre. 
 
A direct objective of aid is to finance additional expenditures. Until the 1990s, state 
governments had not been able to access funds for non-salary expenditures. Aid-support 
to projects and to DPEP facilitated new expenditures on innovations, teacher training, 
textbook development and infrastructure (Int. 12).  It also freed state resources to fund 
additional activities in non-DPEP districts. Expenditure conditions were established for 
both DPEP and SSA, to ensure that aid funds would comprise a net addition to total 
resources.  Between 1990 and 2005, average real education expenditures by the centre 
and the states increased by more than 6 per cent per year.  Accordingly, it seems clear 
that aid resources did not substitute for domestic expenditures on education, and that, 
however small in proportionate terms, they represented a net addition to resources 
available.29  
 
The revenues generated by the cess, introduced in 2004, allowed a more than doubling of 
the anticipated levels of GOI spending on SSA and prompted negotiations for a second 
round of external funding (SSA II). Under the earlier agreement the donors were to meet 
a certain proportion of the total SSA expenditure over and above an annually rising 
threshold. But because SSA expenditures went well beyond those threshold levels, aid 
finance accounted for a much lower proportion of spending than had been promised.  
 
Significant changes in GOI attitudes towards education interventions have occurred over 
the past two decades – in part influenced by donor expertise. For example, it became 
recognised that a reliable data-base for effective planning and monitoring was needed. 
During the 1990s, a district-level school-based panel data set was generated and 
maintained with UNICEF support. NCERT gathered and maintained data on learning 
achievements across states, and SSA has used independent sources to provide accurate 
enrolment estimates (Int. 13).  Again, partly by consequence of donor advocacy, it 
became accepted that local NGOs, including those with access to external funding, can 
play a powerful partnership role with government in helping to implement innovative 
strategies. This modality became an integral part of SSA, where NGOs partnered the 
government in advocacy, accountability and capacity-building. Finally, the system of 
resource transfer and accounting was reformed, with funds for districts being transferred 
electronically.  In all these ways, there was a noticeable impact of donor engagement on 
important aspects of educational management and practice.  
 
The smaller donors having continued engagement with Indian education generally 
believed that resource allocation mechanisms to the states for SSA were inflexible. For 
example, the plan/non-plan dichotomy in the budget meant that unexpected expenditures 
                                                 
29 They also allowed existing priorities to be better addressed. One senior government source indicated 
that the existence and flexibility of DPEP funding allowed central and state governments to bring UEE to 
the top of the priority list, and to sustain expenditures (Int. 13). 
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(eg major repairs) could not be made, even if SSA monies remained unspent. Such 
monies could also not be used for support to innovations.  
 
These gaps suited the comparative advantage of smaller agencies. Working with NGOs 
gave them opportunities to introduce innovative strategies. Where the effectiveness of 
such experiments was demonstrated, both donor agency and NGO could lobby the 
government to scale them up.  In that connection, UNICEF believed its voice to be 
influential, in particular because, not being a traditional donor agency (and thus being 
outside the donor-recipient framework), their integrity was not questioned30. Thus, 
following the success of a UNICEF-funded pilot study - where low tables were supplied 
as work spaces for young school-children - the Uttar Pradesh government adopted it 
throughout the state. UNICEF also helped strengthen District Institutes of Education and 
Training (DIET) and pre-service training (Int.6). Similarly the America India 
Foundation’s demonstration of an effective strategy to accommodate the children of 
migrants in schools began to be acknowledged by changes in central and state 
government policies (Int. 12). USAID has funded projects using radios to support 
education in schools (Int.5). The state governments of Karnataka, Jharkhand and 
Chattisgarh have now taken over the funding and included this initiative in all their 
schools as part of SSA. The Madhya Pradesh and Bihar governments are reported to be 
doing likewise.  In these ways, external funding, directed via NGOs, has been supporting 
innovations relevant to SSA.  
 
Thus, whilst it is clear that donors have had no direct influence on the GOI’s changing 
domestic policy objectives in education, they have, in fact, been influential in initiating 
some of the major changes in the sector by funding innovative projects at their pilot 
stages. Evidence from officials in both donor agencies and in the bureaucracy confirms 
that the first generation of aided projects (APPEP, BEP and Lok Jumbish) provided 
important inputs to DPEP design. Furthermore, aspects of the Shiksha Karmi model were 
transformed into the popular (though problematic) strategy of recruiting para-teachers. 31   
Furthermore, DPEP, of course, was highly influential in the design of SSA.  
 
On the other hand, some observers who had been closely involved in the implementation 
of the earlier projects argued that the progressive centralisation which had occurred as 
part of the shift from small projects to DPEP and then to SSA resulted in some of their 
important elements being lost (Int. 10, 12). The project mode had allowed the diversity of 
conditions and needs in different areas to be recognised, but this was difficult to sustain 
in the more centralised framework of DPEP/SSA, even where district-level planning was 
pursued (Al Samarrai, Bennell, Colclough 2002:59).  
 
                                                 
30 Similar views about independence from the donor relationship strengthening trust and influence were 
held by UNESCO (Int. 2) 
31 Shiksha Karmis were appointed in areas which had no, or dysfunctional, primary schools.  They were 
recruited from the local community on a contract basis. The community support and the intensive training 
given to them compensated for their low educational qualifications. ‘Para teacher’ is a general term used 
for all teachers recruited locally on a contract basis and paid a much lower salary than regular teachers.  
The training given to them has usually been short and nominal.  
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These assessments of aided projects serve to emphasise the difficulties of mainstreaming 
specific innovations in a country with wide regional variations. The deadlines integral to 
the DPEP approach required shortcuts to be made to costly and time-intensive processes.  
For example, in Lok Jumbish, villagers obtained resources for their schools according to 
agreed norms. This was not possible in the case of DPEP, where district planning 
replaced planning at the village and block levels. Data collection also differed in 
important ways: in Lok Jumbish, members of the local community collected data directly 
from all households and schools in their area whereas DPEP data were collated for each 
school by its teachers and were generally of much poorer quality. These differences were 
symptomatic of the fact that, in the latter case, lines of accountability were only towards 
DPEP management, and no longer towards children and their families (Int.16).   
 
Furthermore, the intention that DPEP should scale-up provision in a uniform way across 
states was weakened by the nature of its management and financial allocation processes. 
The requirement that States should meet the recurrent costs implied by expansion under 
plan expenditures meant that the poorer states were often hesitant to utilise their allocated 
development funds. This resulted in varying utilization rates for plan expenditures, with 
the poorest states usually having the lowest indicators (Ints.10,12).   
  
Critics of the system argue that these financial concerns of the states led to distortions in 
strategy. For example, the GOI had required that DPEP resources would be allocated to 
states only after all vacancies in teacher posts had been filled. The recurrent cost 
implications of this led several states to adapt the Shiksha Karmi model, whereby 
untrained contract teachers were recruited at a very low salary and in an unsatisfactory 
way, bringing serious unintended consequences in the poorer states.  The State 
Implementation Societies provided a parallel structure to the state ministry, which 
allowed such changes to be accepted, yet raised major questions for longer-term 
sustainability, given the existing capacity and financing of state ministries. 
 
Thus, whether positive or negative, the donors’ impact on education policy in India was 
strongest through funding innovative projects, and through the demonstration effects such 
projects brought for the rest of the formal school system. The nascent Sector Wide 
Approaches implicit in the designs of DPEP and SSA consolidated these earlier lessons, 
bringing new implementation and management practices in the education sector. 
 
 
Why aid? 
 
In view of the deep sensitivity about national autonomy for education policy and the fact 
that external aid forms a very small proportion of total expenditure on education, it is 
useful to ask why India wants aid for education.  The main answer is that the government 
has accepted aid for education not so much for its additional resources per se, but mainly 
for the other advantages which came with them.  However, the relative balance of these 
advantages is perceived differently by different stakeholders.  
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The agencies perceive their role in a very positive way. The major donors believe that 
their support to DPEP helped boost school quality and innovation and that inclusive 
education was facilitated.  The bilateral agencies providing direct support to NGOs made 
similar claims.32  
 
The government has found aid to be useful in the context of electoral politics. It has 
brought external endorsement for the chosen path, yet the agencies have also been used 
as convenient ‘whipping boys’33 when progress has faltered or where the government has 
faced adverse criticism.34  Accepting aid helped put the global discussions on education 
at the centre of the domestic stage, and where relevant could be used to provide advocacy 
for the government’s own policies. However, the donors were kept away from discussing 
sensitive areas of policy and their inputs were incorporated in ways chosen by the 
government.  
 
The most obvious and conventional benefit of aid is that it provides additional financial 
resources.  It was valued for those purposes by the Planning Commission: one of its 
working groups recommended accepting more aid to reduce the budgetary strain on 
Central Government and to enhance spending discipline (Saxena 2003). We have shown 
that early international aid financed a significant part of the Centre’s expenditure on 
elementary education. Being given in the form of grants, or low-interest loans, its costs 
were much lower than those associated with equivalent loans from domestic sources. An 
added advantage was that the usual budgetary process - whereby unspent funds at year-
end could not be carried over - could be avoided (Int.8). By contrast, aid monies were 
kept in a non-lapsable fund and were expected to be spent more efficiently.  
 
Aid resources added to the revenue available to GOI, and were used with some success to 
influence the education policies of different states. Because the resources were used by 
the Centre to implement jointly-funded projects with the states, they proved to be a useful 
means of mobilising additional state resources and for shifting state spending priorities in 
the desired directions. 
 
However, the GOI representatives interviewed tended not to emphasise these benefits. 
The value attached to aid by the Ministry of Human Development (which includes 
education) was focussed more upon technical issues. Donor inputs on matters of 
procurement and financing were welcomed.  DPEP/SSA particularly benefited from 
receiving critical feedback from those who had a stake in its success (Int. 13).  Although 
neutral evaluations may not be possible where team-members represent stakeholder 
organizations which are keen to show good results (Int. 16), the critical comments made 
during JRMs were judged to be of particular benefit by both agency and government 
bureaucrats. Further, although the need to produce an agreed aide-memoire plays down 
                                                 
32 Ints. 1,3,5,7,11. 
33 This phrase was used by an interviewee from one of the multilateral agencies (Int. 3). 
34 Ayyar (2008) reports that this worked to GOI’s advantage: the fact that problems could be attributed to 
donor influence rather than GoI intent ultimately strengthened GOI’s bargaining power in negotiations 
with agencies over policy design. 
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the significance of dissenting voices, it was certainly used by GoI to improve planning 
and implementation.  
 
Many of these benefits were acknowledged by GOI in its country paper on aid 
effectiveness: 
 
It is important to note that, as well as DP35 money, the external agencies are also 
providing advice and guidance on pro-poor targeting, greater accountability for 
outcomes, attention to quality and improved financial management. In addition, the 
DPs have also helped to increase the level of discipline in programme supervision 
and monitoring and to also raise the quality of technical analysis by bringing in to the 
policy dialogue international experiences from the developed and developing world. 
It is widely acknowledged by GoI that the DPs are adding most value by bringing 
more rigour into the monitoring and review process, particularly the JRM. The DP 
contribution is also helping to focus Government efforts on sustainability issues 
through a dialogue on planning, financial management and community involvement. 
(GOI 2006: 8)  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Over the past two decades, aid to education in India has played a formative role.  We 
have shown that it has had little impact on the establishment or change of Indian policy 
objectives, but that it has had a significant direct impact upon management practice, 
financial reporting, accounting procedures and monitoring arrangements.  These changes 
probably improved the efficiency, and certainly the accountability, of the educational 
process.   
 
Aid has provided additional resources for education in India as a supplement to a growing 
trend of domestic expenditure.  Particularly during the early 1990s, aid provided 
resources for states to increase their non-salary spending on education, with consequent 
benefits for quality. Donors to SSA required that government spending on the programme 
would increase annually at least at a certain minimum level.  In fact, this was greatly 
exceeded, owing mainly to the success of the ‘cess’ tax in raising resources for education, 
which was not, itself, attributable to the presence of aid.    
 
Support, particularly from some of the ‘smaller’ agencies – UNICEF, USAID, Sida, the 
Netherlands, and some international NGOs - resulted in valuable innovative projects 
being supported at the pilot stage, lessons from which have been reflected in national 
programmes.  External support to DPEP strengthened the planning and programming 
capacity of the education ministry and provided useful evidence which affected the ways 
in which SSA was taken to scale. Aid strengthened the government’s hand in its own 
policy advocacy towards the states. External agents could conveniently share some of the 
blame when things went less well than expected, whilst providing evidence for 
international best practice, the lessons from which affected state-level policy.  
                                                 
35 Development Partner 
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Finally, whilst aid to education in India did not serve to change the priorities of the Indian 
government it did act to strengthen them.  Some would argue that this may have brought 
some negative consequences for India, in that GOI was thereby less likely to consider the 
non-primary/elementary subsectors as priorities for reform and expansion.  However, the 
substantial unmet needs of the poorest families in India, very many of whose children had 
had no access to schooling prior to DPEP/SSA, were certainly served better by the 
application of India’s priorities to universalise primary/elementary schooling during the 
past two decades. Although this progress was not a direct consequence of aid, the 
agencies can reasonably claim credit in having encouraged, and helped to strengthen that 
process. 
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Annex: Interviews. 
 
(All interviews were conducted by both authors between February and November 2008) 
 
 
Interview  
no. 
  
Interviewee 
1  Senior Education Specialist, bilateral agency 
2  Director, UN agency 
3  Senior Education Specialist, multilateral agency 
4  Director, multilateral agency. 
5  Education Programme  Specialist  and Senior Education Specialist, 
bilateral agency 
6  Director of Education, UN agency 
7  Ex-Director, multilateral agency 
8  Secretary, GOI Commission 
9  Jt. Secretary, GOI Ministry 
10  Senior policy officer international NGO; earlier with GOI 
11  Senior Policy Officer, Science and Technology, bilateral agency;  earlier 
with GOI 
12  Education director with international NGO; earlier with GOI 
13  Jt. Secretary, GOI Ministry 
14  Senior Education Specialist, multilateral agency 
15  CEO, international education NGO  
16  Chairman, Non-profit Indian Trust; earlier, chairperson of major 
education initiative and Secretary, GOI Ministry. 
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